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The modern economy is currently characterised by some emerging phenomena related to the 
protection of intellectual property. First, technologies are increasingly bought and sold in the 
market, mostly in sectors in which patent protection is relevant and strong enough. Second, 
the open science model is more and more diffused in the technology development process of 
business sectors like (open source) software. Third, scientific discoveries of academic 
researchers, traditionally diffused in an open science system, are increasingly protected 
through intellectual property rights and specifically patents. 
These phenomena highlight that two contrasting models – i.e. the strong intellectual property 
rights (IPR) model, and the open science model – are currently diffusing in the technological 
and economic environment, and shaping in opposite ways the behaviour of different 
institutional agents and organisations. These two models have been analysed in the economic 
and policy literature. They have traditionally been applied to alternative institutional contexts. 
The strong IPR model has been associated to the business environment, while the open 
science model has been associated to the academic or research system. Nevertheless, more 
recently, a strengthening of the IPR system has occurred in the public research system, and 
open science models have been adopted in private sectors like the open source software. 
This paper discusses these different models of intellectual property protection and their 
implications on the innovative activity of firms and economies and the market dynamics. The 
IPR and the open science models present advantages and drawbacks in terms of incentives to 
innovate, adoption of technological innovations, and diffusion of technologies in different 
institutions (large and small firms, public research institutions) and different sectors. This 
paper identifies several policy issues related to the conditions under which the two models can 
be sustainable and beneficial for the economy. 
Under the strong IPR model, scientific and technological knowledge is protected by exclusive 
rights (such as patents) granted to the inventors. The public authority of the country where the 
inventor has applied for its invention ensures the enforcement of the property right. In return 
for such a protection, information on the invention have to be publicly disclosed, in order to   2
enrich the total body of technical knowledge in the world. Such an ever-increasing body of 
public knowledge promotes further creativity and innovation from others actors. This model 
creates strong and direct incentives to innovate, as the owner of the property right retains all 
the possible returns from an innovation. Either in the case in which the innovation is used in-
house to produce products or services to be sold in the final market, or in the case in which 
the new (scientific and technological) knowledge is sold to downstream users in the market 
for technologies (Arora et al., 2001), this model prevents freely available knowledge 
spillovers to be generated. Returns from new scientific and technological knowledge are 
completely privatised at all different stages of technology and product development. 
By contrast, under the open science model, inventors are not granted any right for their 
inventions, nor those who use the same inventions for subsequent developments. New 
scientific and technological knowledge is freely available to anyone in the public domain. 
While the original knowledge cannot be used on an exclusive base, specific applications of 
the same knowledge can be privatised, in some cases. According to this model, new 
knowledge diffuses more rapidly among agents. Inventors do not extract any direct gain from 
the new knowledge, but only indirect incentives. On the one hand, their public reputation 
increases. On the other, and in the long run, they can gain profits from further developments 
or applications of the original knowledge or from career development. This model is typical 
of the academic research (Dasgupta and David, 1994), and partly of the software industry 
(Lerner and Tirole, 2002a and 2004; Gambardella and Hall, 2005). From a social point of 
view, this model maximises the social returns from innovations, but requires some forms of 
co-ordination among independent agents. Absent any co-ordination, individual agents might 
behave as free riders and privatise the public knowledge. 
Both models present advantages and disadvantages from a private and a public perspective. In 
some cases, the two models simultaneously operate. A first case is the software industry, 
where open source software is simultaneously made available with products based on 
proprietary software (i.e. software protected through copyright and without disclosing the 
source code) or patented software. A second case is the university system, where open science 
is the predominant model of knowledge production and diffusion, but patenting and licensing 
of the outcomes of the research is more and more diffused. In both cases, all the relevant 
issues have not been completely assessed and discussed yet, and policy implications have not 
beet fully explored. 
Against this background, this paper focuses on some key and emerging issues on intellectual 
property protection, and discusses potential implications of the strength or openness of IPRs 
on the market dynamics. Specifically, the study examines the effects of (stronger or weaker) 
patent protection on large and small firms, and on entry and growth of new technology-based 
firms. Strengths and weaknesses of both strong IPRs and open science models are then 
analysed and discussed. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief introduction on recent trends in 
intellectual property protection in US and Europe. Sections 3 discusses a few emerging issues 
associated to the strong IPRs system: the development of markets for technologies, the use or 
not use of patents, the patenting of upstream inputs like research tools, the increasing usage of 
litigation and the corresponding (social) costs. Section 4 analyses the system of open science, 
and specifically considers the case of software and the co-existence of patenting and open 
science in the software sector (open source software). Section 5 concludes and discusses some 
policy implications.   3
2.  Recent trends in intellectual property protection: institutional changes and empirical 
evidence  
In the last two decades, the system of intellectual property protection has witnessed a few 
crucial institutional transformations
1. At the same time, patenting trends in different countries 
and technologies and the patenting behaviour of different types of inventive actors have 
changed. In essence, several empirical evidences point up an intensification of the patent 
activities, with differential rates of growth across patent systems, countries, technologies and 
actors. 
The main empirical fact that has attracted the interest of several scholars is the unprecedented 
growth in the demand for protection of intellectual property observed during the 1980s and 
the 1990s. The number of US patent applications has grown from a range of 40-80,000 in the 
1980s to at least 120,000 patents in 1995 (Kortum and Lerner, 1999)
2. This discontinuity has 
also been examined by Hall (2004), who has shown a structural break in the time series of the 
growth of the number of patents in the mid-1980s. The growth rate of the number of patents 
boosted from an average of 0.3 % before the break in 1984 to an average of 6.9 % after 1984. 
At the country level, the largest explosion in the patent activity is observed for US inventors 
at the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and in other Patent Offices, while a similar 
upturn is not registered for European or Japanese inventors. In Europe the rate of growth in 
the 1980s is evident but is not as pronounced as in the United States, while in Japan the rates 
of growth have been marked already since the 1970s. 
In some technologies, like biotechnology and software, the patenting activity intensified more 
than the average, bus in absolute terms the impact on the total growth has been limited 
(Kortum and Lerner, 1999). Hall (2004) has also demonstrated that the intensification of 
patenting activities has not been specific to some technologies, but to some sectors (i.e. the 
electrical, electronics, computing and scientific instrument sectors). When looking at the 
applicant level, it is also worth noting that the growth rate of patents for new patenters has 
resulted larger that the growth rate of patents by incumbent patenters (Kortum and Lerner, 
1999). 
During the 1980s and the 1990s the patent system has also witnessed some important 
institutional changes, which have contributed to the strengthening of patent protection. First, 
in 1982 the creation of a unified Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) for patent 
settlements in the US replaced the courts of appeal in local circuits. This decision marked a 
“pro-patent” behaviour of the courts (Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998; Kortum and Lerner, 1999; 
Jaffe, 2000; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001), as desired by many of its advocates (Granstrand, 2005). 
Kortum and Lerner (1999) have reported that before the creation of CAFC (between 1953 and 
1978) only 62% of decisions were in favour of the patent holders, while this share has 
increased to 90% after the creation of the CAFC (from 1982 to 1990). The reversing of 
decisions of invalidity or non-infringements also increased from 12% pre-CAFC to 28% post-
CAFC. Moreover, in some court decisions concerning patent suits the amount of damages to 
be paid for infringement has been strikingly high. Rivette and Kline (2000) report that Kodak 
had to pay, after the infringement of Polaroid’s patents on instantaneous camera, $ 925 
million of damages to Polaroid, $ 100 million of legal fees for a 14-year long battle. Kodak 
was also forced to close a plant of $ 1,5 billion, to fire 700 employees and finally to spend $ 
500 million to buy-back 16 million cameras sold in 10 years. This accounted for a total of 
                                                 
1 For a long term historical account of the evolution and diffusion of the patent system see Granstrand (2005). 
2 For a longer-term evolution of the patent activities see Lerner (2002).   4
more than $ 3 billions. In another settlement in 1991, Minolta had to pay $ 127.5 million to 
Honeywell for having used a patent, even though not used by Honeywell (Rivette and Kline, 
2000). Nevertheless, the effects of CAFC were not immediate after its formation. The impact 
of CAFC on the favourable legal treatment of patent rights in US courts was not widely 
publicized until the mid-1980s. During this period, a series of business press articles 
appeared, and diffused a common sense on strengthening of patent protection (Forbes, 1985 
and 1986; Fortune, 1986). 
 Second, at the international level, the TRIPS agreement of 1994 represented another hallway 
of the pro-patent era. It focused on the setting of international standard for IP protection, 
assisting particularly the interests of multinational corporations for a stronger international 
intellectual property protection, but also engendering higher barriers for developing countries 
(Granstrand, 2005). 
Finally, in 1980 the Bayh-Dole Patent and Trademark Amendment Act was adopted. By 
substituting the specific Institutional Patent Agreements that universities were obliged to set 
with federal agencies, the new Act allowed unlimited patenting and exclusive licensing of 
results of federally funded research, and made easier these activities (Mowery et al., 2004).  
The Bayh-Dole Act contributed to a stronger protection of the intellectual property, by 
providing incentives to increasingly protect research outputs to institutions traditionally 
producing knowledge made freely available in the public domain. Mowery and Sampat 
(2005) illustrate that the share of US university patents on all US domestic patents has 
increased from less than 1% at the end of the 1970s to more than 3.5% at the end of the 
1990s. However, they report that there is no evidence of a change in the patent propensity 
over time (relative to R&D). A large portion of the growth of the share of US university 
patents is covered by biomedical patents, due to the expanded opportunities for commercial 
applications of patents in the related technological fields. Thursby and Thursby (2003) also 
report some data from the 1991 and 2000 surveys of Association of University Technology 
Managers (AUTM, 1999 and 2001) showing that after the Bayh-Dole Act there has been a 
remarkable growth of the number of inventions disclosed (84%), number of patent 
applications (238%), licensing agreements (161%) and royalties from licensing agreements 
(520%). Furthermore, after the Bayh-Dole Act, also Japan and some European countries 
introduced legislations ruling the transfer of intellectual property rights to individual 
researchers or to the institutions with the aim of improving the technology transfer from 
university to industry. 
An additional reinforcement of the IPR system derives from the expansion of the range of 
admitted subject matters for patenting undergone in the last two decades. Several authors have 
reported court decisions of validity of patents covering inventions previously non patentable, 
like biotechnologies, software and business methods (Cohen and Lemley, 2001; Gallini, 2002; 
Bessen and Hunt, 2004; Hall, 2003; Graham and Mowery, 2003). In 1980 the decision 
Diamomd vs. Chakrabarty allowed the patentability of genetically engineered bacteria. With 
the Diamond vs Diehr dispute in 1981 software began to be patentable. Finally, the State 
Street Bank and Trust vs. Signature Financial Group in 1998 opened the patentability of 
business methods. 
Bessen and Hunt (2004) documented a continuous growth in the number of software patents 
in the US during the last 25 years. The share on the total patents has also jumped from 1.1% 
in 1976 to 5.2% in 1990 and to 14.9% in 2002. The software sector has also been 
characterised by the emergence of the open source model of software development, 
characterised by disclosure and sharing of innovations (Lerner and Tirole, 2002a). However, 
the future sustainability of both models and the effects on the rate of patenting or increasing 
disclosure is still unclear. Issues concerning software will be better explored in Section 4.   5
3.  The effects of strong IPRs on large and small (technology-based) firms 
Subsequently to the changes in the patent environment described in the previous section, the 
economic and managerial literature has started to debate on the reasons for the explosion of 
patenting activities by different actors (large and small firms, public research institutions, new 
firms), and on the effects of the strengthening of the patent system on the incentives to 
innovate by large and small firms, the diffusion of knowledge and the pace of technical 
progress, and the incentives to invest in the development of second generation technologies. 
Among the benefits of a strong IPR system, the mostly cited (and commonly accepted) is that 
it encourages the entry of new firms and the commercialisation of technologies. Firms 
specialised in the supply of technology-based components but without downstream 
manufacturing facilities have no alternative means for protecting their technological assets – 
and earn profits from them – other then IPRs. Especially to these firms, but also to larger 
manufacturing firms involved in technology trade, a system of strong and enforceable IPRs is 
a necessary condition for their business model. Therefore, strong IPRs allow markets for 
technology to operate, and encourage the division of innovative labour among independent 
firms and the entry of specialised technology producers. 
At the same time, an increased patent protection is also associated to potential costs. First, in 
the case of cumulative, complex technologies, if intellectual property rights are assigned to 
several developers of technological components, the integration of these components in the 
complex product might be difficult, or at least result in an increase of transaction costs. 
Hence, an excessive fragmentation of property rights is often associated to the so-called 
“tragedy of anti-commons”. Second, strong IPRs might induce firms to protect with patents a 
larger fraction of technologies, even those technologies that are not actually used in any 
existing product (sleeping patents), or whose only purpose is to avoid competitors to explore 
specific technological trajectories (blocking patents). Indeed, stronger IPRs are often 
associated to a larger share of unused patented technologies. Third, as exposed in the previous 
section, the pro-patent era has put another actor into the patenting arena: universities. The 
direct consequence of their aptitude towards patenting is that the (scientific and technological) 
knowledge that was previously available for free is now traded in the market for technology. 
Finally, stronger IPRs are also associated with increasing costs of litigations. Apart from the 
financial resources spent in patent suits and settlements, the most relevant indirect effect is 
that increased litigation costs reduce the incentives to innovate especially for new and small 
firms for which the costs of a suit may be unaffordable. As a consequence, from a social point 
of view, litigations often result in a transfer of resources from small to large firms. 
We discuss these issues more extensively in the following sections. Our aim is to provide 
theoretical and empirical evidence of the benefits and costs associated with a system of strong 
IPRs. Furthermore, we aim at discussing the effects of such benefits and costs on both large 
incumbent firms, and small technology-based new entrants. 
3.1. IPRs and markets for technology  
One of the commonly accepted implications of the existence of (strong) property rights is that 
they allow technologies and technological knowledge to be exchanged and traded in 
specialised markets for technology. The functioning of such markets has been empirically 
documented for several high-tech industries, like chemicals, biopharmaceuticals, software, 
semiconductors and electronics. The number of technology transactions amongst independent 
organizations has constantly grown especially during the 1990s (Arora et al., 2001), even   6
though the presence of an active market for technology during the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries has been documented as well in the American glass industry (Lamoreaux 
and Sokoloff, 1997 and 1999). 
In the chemical processing industry, an upstream sector of independent technology suppliers 
has emerged since the switch to petrochemicals after the Second World War (Freeman, 1968; 
Arora and Gambardella, 1998). New specialised suppliers – the so-called specialised 
engineering firms (SEFs) – have appeared and have started to diffusely license process 
technologies to downstream chemical companies in the developed countries, and later in the 
less developed countries. The market for process technologies in chemicals, however, has 
been also operated by large chemical corporations, which have been (and still are) involved in 
licensing their proprietary technologies to smaller chemical and non-chemical firms (Cesaroni 
and Mariani, 2001; Cesaroni, 2003). Similarly, in the biopharmaceutical industry, a division 
of innovative labour between new research-intense biotechnology firms and large drug 
manufacturers has been particularly pronounced during the 1990s and nowadays (Cockburn et 
al., 1999). Licensing contracts are the preferred way that specialised suppliers use to provide 
pharmaceutical companies with new chemical compounds, research services, or research tools 
like software programs for drug research, testing, etc. (Red Herring, 1998). Finally, in the 
semiconductors and electronics industries, licensing and cross-licensing contracts are a 
common solution that established firms adopt in order to obtain the rights to use technological 
components owned by several and dispersed firms for the development of complex products 
(Grindley and Teece, 1997). 
The key point of these findings is that the functioning of such markets for technology is 
strictly linked to the existence of patents and an efficient system of protection of intellectual 
property rights. On the one hand, the possibility to protect part of a technology with one or 
more patents allows the same technology to be licensed to third parties. In situations in which 
a technology holder enters into a licensing agreement with a potential buyer or licensee, the 
information disclosed from the former can be used by the latter to invent around (Gallini, 
1992). However, if patents protect the codified component of the technology, the possibility 
to invent around declines. The stronger the patent protection, the greater the cost of inventing 
around, and hence the higher is the potential advantage arising from licensing. The chemical 
industry provides a clear example in this respect (Arora, 1995 and 1997). 
On the other hand, markets for technology are operated either by large corporations with 
unused patents in their patent portfolios, or by specialised technology suppliers that use 
patents to protect their core technological assets. In the first case, markets for technologies 
represent an additional option available to large firms in order to exploit (sell or license) 
existing unused patent-protected technologies. Usually, firms tend to protect with patents 
more technologies than the amount they actually use in their core business operations. Apart 
from processes of technological diversification, unused patents have a strategic motivation 
(sleeping patents, strategic delays, etc.) (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000). These patents can 
be used for blocking innovative activity of rivals, or just because technologies and products 
based on such technologies are not completely developed. As a matter of fact, the share of 
unused patents in the portfolios of large corporations might be relevant. A recent survey 
(European Commission, 2005) provides evidence on the use and value of more than 9,000 
European (EPO) patents of inventors in six European countries (France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom). Results from this survey (Table 1) show that the 
share of patents (not) used both to prevent competitors to invest in specific technological 
areas (i.e. blocking patents), or to wait for future uses (i.e. sleeping patents), ranges from 
about 18%, in the case of small companies, to 40%, in the case of large firms and universities. 
The share of unused patents is almost 45% in other public research organisations. Obviously,   7
these results reflect differences in missions and goals of the institutions, but also show that the 
lost of potential benefits due to unused patented technologies might be a severe concern for 
the economy on the whole. 
 
Table 1 – Share of patents actually used economically by type of inventors’ employer 





Licensing  Used Only  Blocking 
(unused) 
Sleeping 
(unused)  Total 
Large Firms  3.03% 3.22% 3.03%  49.93%  21.72%  19.06%  100.00% 
Medium Firms  5.38% 3.59% 1.20%  65.62%  13.90%  10.31%  100.00% 
Small Firm  14.97% 6.90%  3.89% 55.78% 9.62%  8.84%  100.00% 
Hospitals, Foundations, 
Private Research Org.  35.42% 6.25%  0.00% 16.67%  18.75%  22.92%  100.00% 
Public Research Org.  23.19% 5.80%  4.35% 21.74%  10.87%  34.06%  100.00% 
Universities & Education  22.50% 5.00%  5.00% 26.25%  13.75%  27.50%  100.00% 
Other Government Org.  16.67% 8.33%  0.00% 41.67% 8.33% 25.00%  100.00% 
Other  17.02% 8.51%  4.26% 34.04%  12.77%  23.40%  100.00% 
Total  6.17% 3.92% 3.06%  50.53%  18.83%  17.50%  100.00% 
Source: European Commission (2005), Patval Survey. 
 
In some cases, however, firms might be willing to sell these unused technologies to other 
firms. In an often cited survey conducted over European, North American and Japanese firms 
(BTG, 1998), it has been documented that unused technologies, which would have a 
commercial value if they were sold or licensed, amount to more than 30% of patent portfolios 
of the surveyed firms. Furthermore, nearly two-thirds of such organisations have a share of 
unutilised patents, and one in eight have in excess more than 1,000 patents. Most of them find 
licensing out attractive, primarily because of potential financial, economic or commercial 
benefits. 
Examples of firms that have started to license their unused patent-protected technologies can 
be found in several industries. For instance, in chemicals, British Petroleum, Union Carbide, 
and many others have been particularly active in licensing (Grindley and Nickerson, 1996; 
Arora et al., 2001). In electronics and semiconductors, IBM has earned almost $ 1 billion in 
1998 by licensing its patents (Rivette and Kline, 1999), and Texas Instruments has earned 
royalties of almost $ 1.8 billion during a five-year period (Grindley and Teece, 1997). In 
general, many other large corporations from different industries have started to sell their 
patent-protected technologies. Some of these companies, such as Boeing, Monsanto, Philips, 
Procter & Gamble, have also used virtual marketplaces (e.g., “yet2.com”).
3 
Apart from large corporations, the most relevant evidence of how patent protection can allow 
firms to enter the market for technologies is that of small technology suppliers.  
Table 1 shows that small firms licence almost 26% of their patents (including patents that are 
only licensed, patents that are simultaneously licensed and internally used, and cross-licensed 
patents). This share is only about 9% for large firms and 11% for medium firms (100-250 
employees). The share of licensed patents is the largest for universities and other research 
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organisations. It is also worth noting that small firms use about 15% of their patents “only” 
for licensing agreements, against 3% for large firms. 
The core business of small technology-based firms is in fact to develop new technologies (or 
new technological components) to be sold to other firms placed downstream in the value 
chain. They are not directly involved in manufacturing or marketing, and hence lack 
appropriate complementary assets needed to exploit their technological competences (Teece, 
1986). However, if they can protect their technologies with patents, and if patents are strong 
enough to prevent risks of infringement or to be invented around, such small technology 
suppliers can trade their technologies and overcome the lack of complementary assets (Arora 
et al., 2001). 
In other words, strong patents are critical to encourage vertically specialized suppliers enter 
the market, because appropriate contracts for the exchange of technology and related tacit 
know-how can be defined. In relative terms, the value of patent protection to these firms is 
higher than to large established technology holders, which have the capabilities to protect 
their innovations with alternative means, and compete in the market for products. As 
demonstrated by Arora and Fosfuri (2003), the presence of a firm in the market for products 
and the level of competition in this market affect her incentives to licence technologies to 
other firms wishing to enter into the same product market. In this case, a revenue effect – i.e. 
the increase in revenues coming from the licensing fees – and a rent dissipation effect – i.e. 
the reduction of revenues deriving from the increased competition in the product market – are 
compared. If a firm is a monopolist in the product market she will have no incentives to 
license her technologies, because the rent dissipation effect will never be compensated by 
incoming licensing fees. By contrast, if there are other competitors in the product market, the 
rent dissipation effect will be shared across all competitors. The effect on each firm will be 
marginal, and this will increase each firm’s incentive to license. On the other hand, small 
firms missing the complementary production and commercialisation capabilities and with no 
share in the product market have the maximum incentives to license their technologies.  
Contrarily to large companies, small independent technology suppliers have no alternative 
possibilities to protect their technologies and appropriate the benefits of their innovations 
other than by means of patent protection. In turn, the existence of a system of strong 
intellectual property rights enhances the incentives to innovate of the specialised technology 
suppliers compared to established companies. As a consequence, entry of such firms into the 
market for technologies should be facilitated. Empirical evidence in the cases of 
biopharmaceuticals (Cockburn et al., 1999), chemicals (Arora and Gambardella, 1998), and 
environmental technologies (Arduini and Cesaroni, 2004) shows that entry in such industries 
has been characterised by similar dynamics. 
Hence, from an industry perspective, strong IPRs not only determine an increase in the overall 
level of investments in R&D and innovations, but also contribute to the locus of innovative 
activities (Arora and Merges, 2004). By allowing the upsurge of smaller independent 
suppliers, strong IPRs contribute to the “dis-integration” of industry structures, and to an 
increasing division of innovative labour at the industry level. Consequently, the number of 
integrated, Chandlerian large firms should reduce accordingly. 
 
Universities as suppliers of upstream inputs 
Similarly to small independent technology suppliers, whose entry into the market for 
technology has been facilitated by the strengthening of IPRs, universities (and other Public 
Research Organisations – PROs) can be considered a second, relevant actor of such a market.   9
Similarly to small technology suppliers, their entry into the market has been allowed by the 
possibility to protect with patents their research results.  
University patenting is not a new phenomenon. In the US, universities and other publicly 
funded research laboratories have been active in patenting for a long time, since the earliest 
years of the twentieth century (Mowery and Sampat, 2001). However, since the late 1980s, 
the number of patents from PROs has significantly increased (Jaffe, 2000; Carlsson and Frihd, 
2000). Recent data of the National Science Foundation (NSF, 2004) report an escalation of 
the annual number of university patents from less than 500 in the early 1980s to more than 
3,000 in the late 1990s (Figure 1). As recalled in previous sections, the change in the 
institutional framework that has taken place in the US during the 1980s, with the introduction 
of the Bayh-Dole Act, has been the main driver of this phenomenon. Accordingly, many 
universities have modified their mission and their organisations. Specific Technology 
Transfer Offices have been created, with the explicit aim of promoting effective licensing of 
patented technologies. The successful example of the University of Columbia is a 
representative case in point (Mowery and Sampat, 2001). 
 














































































































Total academic patenting Top 100 universities All others
 
Source: NSF (2004). 
 
As a matter of fact, following the adoption of the Bayh-Dole Act, many universities have 
started to protect the results of their research activity with patents, and to assign exclusive and 
non-exclusive licenses to private companies. While the broad diffusion of research results was 
(one of) the main concerns of public research organisations, and a general objective of their 
mission, with the advent of university patenting the diffusion of knowledge from university to 
the industry has been subject to additional barriers. Especially in those scientific fields – such 
as biomedical and genetic research – where results of scientific research have immediate 
technological (and commercial) applications, universities have used patents in order to extract 
the maximum value from them (Mowery et al., 2001). Some of them have considered the 
possibility to license their patent-protected research results as an additional source of funds,   10
capable of balancing the reduction of funds from governments and national agencies. In so 
doing, they have become active in the market for technologies. 
As Table 1 revealed for the case of EPO patents of European inventors, compared to other 
institutional actors, universities and public research organisations have the second largest 
share of patents of respective patent portfolios licensed to other organisations. In general, 
universities and public research organisations are more involved in patent licensing than 
industrial firms (European Commission, 2005). Table 2 also reports the average level of 
importance (on a scale 1 to 5) of different reasons for patenting by type of institution. 
Licensing is considered relatively more important for universities and PROs than for firms. 
Prevention from imitation and blocking patents is not an important reason for patenting by 
universities and PROs, while only these actors consider reputation quite important. 
 
Table 2 – Reasons for patenting by type of inventors’ employer 
 
Commercial 
exploitation  Licensing  Cross-licensing Prevention from 
imitation  Blocking patents  Reputation 
Large Firms  3.76 1.96 1.96 3.85 3.08 2.26 
Medium Firms  3.91 1.76 1.35 3.87 3.09 2.14 
Small Firm  4.03 2.26 1.32 3.66 2.87 2.14 
Hospitals, Foundations, 
Private Research Org.  3.65 3.58 1.25 3.27 2.58 2.44 
Public Research Org.  3.05 3.00 1.54 2.86 2.05 2.91 
Universities & Education  3.48 3.15 1.59 2.85 2.42 2.94 
Other Government Org.  2.54 2.77 1.15 2.38 2.15 1.23 
Other  3.39  2.8  1.74 3.46 2.54 1.89 
Total  3.78 2.06 1.79 3.76 3.01 2.27 
Source: European Commission (2005), Patval Survey. 
 
Interestingly, once excluded the peculiar case of individual innovators (i.e. innovators who 
are not employees of any private or public institution), the survey of the European 
Commission (2005) reports that universities are also the most active institution to use their 
patents to create new companies, typically through processes of spin-offs creation (Figure 2). 
Taken together, these two figures confirm how, contrarily to firms involved in manufacturing 
and product commercialisation, universities use patents through external exploitation 
processes. 
   11























Source: European Commission (2005), Patval Survey. 
 
Apart from motivations that induce PROs to adopt a patent licensing strategy, and conditions 
that motivated governments to approve the Bayh-Dole Act and subsequent patenting of 
university research results, what matters from a policy perspective are the possible 
implications that university patenting might have on innovative activity of companies placed 
downstream in the innovation process. University patenting represents a radical change in the 
traditional aptitude of openness and diffusion of scientific knowledge, whose consequences 
are not completely clear and explored. 
While some authors (Etzkowitz et al., 2000) advocate an increased industrial finalisation of 
research activity promoted by PROs, and an increased role of PROs in local economic 
development, others (Florida, 1999; Salter et al., 2000) adopt an opposite perspective. 
According to this alternative point of view, public research institutions and universities should 
pay more attention to the training of human capital, and to the long-term development of a 
freely-available stock of knowledge that firms can then deploy for their innovation purposes. 
The attention posed by PROs on patenting is likely to determine a more than reasonable delay 
in the publication of results, and an alteration of the traditional system of incentives that 
normally characterize the behaviour of researchers. This change would determine a potential 
damage to the correct functioning of the scientific community, and ultimately result in a 
reduction of innovation potential for the whole economy, or in a modification of the research 
agenda of PROs towards more applied research and resolution of specific industrial needs 
(Dasgupta and David, 1994). 
In sum, although the primary political motivation for allowing universities to patent their 
research results has been that of permitting them to assign exclusive licenses to private 
companies, and hence offer such companies adequate incentives to exploit results arising 
from university research, in the long run this policy might generate negative effects that 
would reduce (or counterbalance) the short-term advantages. Solutions to mitigate these 
negative effects, and reduce the trade-off between positive short-term advantages and 
negative long-term disadvantages are required.   12
3.2. The problem of “anti-commons” and fragmentation of IPRs 
If strong intellectual property rights favour the entry into the market for technology of small 
independent technology suppliers (and universities), and hence result in potential benefits to 
the economy, major problems arise when technologies are cumulative and systemic. 
Unfortunately, in several industries this is the case. Two canonical examples in this respect 
are those of the semiconductors and biopharmaceutical industries (see Hall and Ziedonis, 
2001 and Hellen and Eisenberg, 1998).  
A complex product based on a cumulative technology is made of several components and 
sub-systems, whose development and production is often demanded to different, independent 
firms. A system integrator willing to produce the complex product needs to collect all the 
different components from different producers. However, if property rights for each 
component have been assigned to the different producers, each producer has the right to 
exclude others from the use of her component, and hence to reduce the possibilities to the 
integrator to produce the complex product. The larger the fragmentation of property rights 
among independent organisations, and the larger the scope of each patent, the higher the effort 
and costs sustained by the system integrator to collect all the property rights needed to 
produce the complex product
4. This problem gives rise to the so-called “tragedy of anti-
commons” (Hellen and Eisenberg, 1998). 
If transaction costs were not a problem, the integrator would simply bargain with each patent 
holder the appropriate fee for the licensing of each component. However, in a more realistic 
world, the presence of transaction costs might induce the potential system integrator not to 
collect all the property rights. For instance, in order to extract the maximum value of her 
innovation, the holder of property rights over an important component of the complex product 
may use her patent to block (“hold-up”) the collection of the entire set of property rights. If 
there are not useful technological alternatives, and if the scope of the patent is large enough to 
prevent the integrator to invent around, a “hold-up” problem is likely to occur. 
Several causes bring to the emergence of a “hold-up” problem (Arora et al., 2001).  
The first one is the extent of fragmentation of property rights amongst producers of 
components. When property rights are spread across dispersed patent holders, the incentive to 
collect all of them declines. Furthermore, the incentives to invest for the development of a 
complementary technology decline as well, given that each owner of a single component has 
to incur in higher transaction costs if she were to collect all the required property rights to 
produce the integrated product. 
The second one is the capability to find alternatives of the technological components, or to 
develop the components in-house. If useful alternatives to the components can not be found, 
the bargaining position of the patent holder increases, hence increasing the overall level of 
transaction costs. Indeed, according to the traditional transaction costs literature (Williamson, 
1975), such costs increase in the presence of specificity of investments and opportunistic 
behaviour of the agents. This is the case of holders of property rights over single components 
seeking to extract as much of the rent as possible. 
Third, a “hold-up” problem is more likely to arise if holders of patents on key components are 
non-manufacturing firms (such as specialised technology suppliers or public research 
institutions). Such organisations lack downstream complementary assets needed to 
appropriate the returns from inventions, and are more likely to bargain more aggressively for 
                                                 
4 See also Merges and Nelson (1990) and Scotchmer (1991) for a discussion on the impact of patent scope on 
first generation and second-generation innovators in cumulative and science-based innovations.   13
obtaining licensing fees. By contrast, patent holders with market shares in the product market 
should find cooperative strategies more attractive, and should be less sensible to the amount 
of licensing fees.  
Finally, the fourth cause of “hold-up” problems is the case of sequential innovations. 
Sequential innovations put the system integrator in a very challenging position. Once the 
integrator has collected the rights over a share of components, the bargaining power of the 
patent holders of the remaining components increases drastically. Indeed, the first purchases 
represent a sunk cost to the system integrator, which she aims at covering in any case, even at 
the cost of leaving at the remaining component holders the largest part of the surplus 
generated by the technology. 
One of the main consequences of the “hold-up” problem is that firms, especially those with 
large investments in technology-specific assets, will patent more aggressively than otherwise 
expected (Ziedonis, 2004). The basic idea is related to the expectations of the system 
integrator to be suited for patent infringements. Given the dispersion of property rights, it is 
unlikely that a single firm can sign contracts (for the use of external technological 
components) with each patent holder, and it is much more likely that she will exclude those 
holders of technological components that are marginal or far from the core of the technology. 
However, this strategic choice increases the risks of infringement of property rights. Disputes 
for infringement of patents often end up with a settlement in which the two parts exchange 
their respective patent portfolio through cross-licensing agreements. The bargaining power of 
each part increases the larger the extent of the patent portfolio. As a consequence, firms 
increase ex-ante the size of their patent portfolios expecting to enter in future (cross-)licensing 
negotiations. In turn, a dynamic process arises: fragmentation of property rights in sectors 
based on cumulative and complex technologies increases the risks of infringement, given the 
difficulties in collecting all the property rights spread over several, dispersed agents; in order 
to mitigate the risks of infringement in subsequent licensing and cross-licensing transactions, 
firms patent more aggressively; as a consequence of this patenting behaviour, the 
fragmentation of property rights increases. 
One of the sectors in which this mechanism is more visible is that of semiconductors and 
electronics. Empirical studies have demonstrated that, first, the extensive use of licensing and 
cross-licensing agreements is the direct consequence of large transaction costs that firms face 
when they try to put together dispersed property rights for the development of complex 
products (Grindley and Teece, 1997); second, firms that have made large investments in 
costly and rapidly depreciating facilities are more likely to patent more, in order to reduce the 
risks of being held-up by external patent owners, and to negotiate access to external 
technologies on more favourable terms (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). For these companies, an 
increase in patenting is the result of a strategic concern, rather than simply reflecting an 
increase in R&D productivity. 
Even though these results highlight potential social costs associated to a higher propensity to 
patent, and to assign stronger patent protection, the same authors (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001) 
suggest a positive effect deriving from the existence of strong IPRs to the sector dynamics, at 
least in the semiconductors industry. In this industry, stronger patent rights seem particularly 
critical to design firms, i.e. those smaller firms specialised in the design of new components 
or products not directly involved in manufacturing. Not only patents are important for 
defensive reasons and for improving their competitive position vis-à-vis market rivals. More 
relevant is the possibility to signal their capability to defend specific market niches, and hence 
attracting additional venture capital funds.   14
Furthermore, recent empirical evidence suggests that the “anti-commons” problem may not be 
as ubiquitous as predicted by the literature. In the case of research tools in biomedical 
innovations, by analysing the results of interviews conducted with large pharmaceutical 
companies, small biotechnology firms, university personnel, and patent attorneys, Cohen et 
al. (2003) suggest that the problem of “anti-commons” is overall considered as manageable. 
Indeed, the vast majority of respondents declared that they have never encountered a 
breakdown problem, they have never modified a defined line of research due to impossibility 
to use specific discoveries or research tools (also because ample technological opportunities 
still exist in this field), and they consider that the difficulty of managing several licensing 
contracts and of paying relevant amount of royalties can be overcome. Moreover, the authors 
suggest possible working solutions to resolve the “anti-commons” problem and related 
restriction on access of research tools. Besides to licensing negotiations, firms might adopt a 
combination of different solutions, such as inventing around, offshore acquisition of 
alternative technologies, challenge in court, and eventually infringement. Apart from these 
private solutions, however, the problem needs an adequate institutional response made 
available to all potential users of upstream inputs. In the case of research tools, public 
databases provided by public consortium might be one of such solutions. 
Apart from these private solutions, however, the problem needs an adequate institutional 
response made available to all potential users of upstream inputs. In the case of research tools, 
public databases provided by public consortium might be one of such solutions. In fields 
different from biomedical research tools other “public” solutions might be available or likely. 
For instance, in the case of software, the provision of open source software usually goes along 
with a Generalised Public Licence (GPL), according to which the producer of a open source 
program requires that all modifications of the program be subject to the same rules of 
openness, i.e. the source code of all modifications ought to be made available to the public as 
the original program (Lerner and Tirole, 2002b). It has been demonstrated that this solution 
creates a co-ordination condition between the different program producers and users, and 
favours the formation of a public equilibrium (Gambardella and Hall, 2005). 
3.3. The social cost of litigation  
Another negative effect associated with a system of strong intellectual property protection is 
that the enforcement of the property rights is usually very costly, and, in general, the social 
loss of resources due to litigations in legal disputes is relevant. Furthermore, these costs are 
unevenly sustained by the different actors (individuals vs. firms, large firms vs. small firms, 
firms with different characteristics). In turn, litigation costs may both mitigate the positive 
effects arising from strong IPRs, and reduce the incentives to innovate in the long run, 
especially in those technological fields where IPR protection is mostly relevant. 
Statistics on litigations show that the crude number of patent suits filed in the US has 
constantly grown during the last two decades – although with some differences among 
different technological areas – following the constant increase of patenting over the same 
period of time. If the growth of patenting is taken into account (i.e., if percentages of suits 
filings per thousand of patents are considered instead of crude number of filings), no trend 
increase in the filing of suits can be observed. For instance, in a recent study, Lanjouw and 
Schankerman (2003) analyse the filing rates by different technology fields (drugs, other 
health, chemicals, electronics, mechanical, computers, biotechnology, and miscellaneous) 
during three time periods: 1978-84, 1985-90 and 1991-95. They show that the propensity to 
litigation varies among fields. For all the technological fields, and for the whole period 1978-
1995, the average number of suits filed (per thousand patents) is 19. The lowest rates are for   15
chemicals (11.8 suits filed per thousand patents), electronics (15.4) and mechanical (16.9). 
The highest rates of filings are in “other health”, miscellaneous, computers and 
biotechnology. Interestingly, computers and biotechnology are newer technological areas 
compared to the others, hence demonstrating that litigation is mostly expected in those 
technological fields characterised by greater uncertainty about legal outcomes. However, 
when time trends are considered, and once the growth in patenting is taken into account, the 
study shows that no increase in litigation (in relative terms) occurred in any technological 
field. Furthermore, very few patent suits actually go to trial. Approximately 95% of all patent 
suits settle either before or during trial. In particular, 78% settle before the pre-trial hearing, 
an additional 16% settle before trial, and 1% settle during trial. 
Even though most patent suits end up with a settlement before or during trial, about half of the 
estimated legal costs of litigation are incurred before the end of the discovery phase (AIPLA, 
2001), thus making litigation extremely costly. Moreover, from a social perspective, 
settlements before trials are likely to lead to collusive outcomes, hence generating a social 
loss of resources. 
Estimates of direct costs due to litigation are difficult to provide, and generally result in 
divergent figures. Relatively to the amount of risk, patent litigation costs may spread from 
half a million dollar to three million dollars (AIPLA, 2001). Relatively to the number of 
claims that are under examination, direct costs are estimated in half a million dollars per claim 
(Barton, 2000). In aggregate terms, annual patent suits may generate more than 4 billion 
dollars in legal fees (Berman, 2002).  
Furthermore, the time spent in trials is generally very long. The time lag between a suit filing 
and the final resolution has been estimated in 32 months on average, in the case of District 
Court suits (Magrab, 1993). Similarly, another evidence on the length of suits shows that 
while patent suits only represent 0.57 percent of all civil cases in the federal courts, they 
account for over nine percent of those that require a trial of twenty days or more (Berman, 
2002). 
The reason that makes legal costs so relevant is twofold. On the one hand, legal standards 
associated to patents and patent suits make the environment in the federal courts unfriendly. 
According to Hall et al. (2004), one of the difficulties opponents in patent disputes find 
concerns the process of proofs formation. In order to prove a claim invalid “clear and 
convincing” evidence has to be provided, while in ordinary civil suits the simple 
“preponderance” of proofs is required. This difference in standards makes patent suits 
particularly costly, and creates strong evidentiary barriers that challengers have to face. As a 
matter of facts, since the creation of CAFC, and subsequently to the rapid increase in 
patenting during the last decades in the US, the rate of success of challenges to patent validity 
has declined from fifty to about thirty percent (Lemley and Allison, 1998). 
On the other hand, the ways in which attorneys face patent suits contribute to the increase in 
direct legal costs (Berman, 2002). First, if compared to the overall monetary value that 
challengers can gain from the suit, the amount of legal fees associated to each patent suit can 
be considered of marginal relevance. Firms often tend to neglect the importance of such costs, 
convinced that additional legal costs might generate (more than) proportional litigation 
advantages. They tend to prefer high-quality lawyers adopting an aggressive and costly 
approach. Furthermore, attorneys usually prefer firms aiming at avoiding early settlements 
instead of waiting for trial response. The main reason is not that lawyers consciously avoid 
early settlements, but tend to prefer more aggressive firms expecting to earn more money 
from protracted patent litigations. In turn, those firms adopting a less aggressive approach are 
eventually selected out of the financially competitive market of attorneys. As a matter of   16
facts, according to the study of Berman (2002), the median legal fees for a case of patent 
litigation through court trial is about two million dollars per side, and it is constantly 
increasing. 
Apart from direct costs, patent litigations generate indirect costs whose relevance is even 
more important for the society on the whole. Often, rather than the actual amount of legal 
costs associated to litigations, it is the risk of incurring in such costs to create negative effects 
and to induce firms to modify their behaviours accordingly. In industries where patent 
protection is stronger, the risk of being suited for patent infringement and hence incurring the 
direct legal costs associated to a trial creates a barrier to entry, and prevents firms from 
investing in innovations. In turn, contrarily to policy expectations, a system of strong property 
rights might reduce the overall level of investments in R&D and innovative activities, 
especially for small firms that are most exposed to the risks of patent litigations. Since small 
firms often lack the required financial resources to sustain long and costly litigation causes, 
they under-invest in those areas where patent protection of large firms is higher. 
This conclusion is supported by earlier empirical evidence. For example, Lerner (1995) shows 
that small firms reduce R&D investments in the fields in which the threat of litigation from 
larger firms is high. Similarly, Lanjouw and Lerner (2001) find that large firms use the 
instrument of preliminary injunction to discourage R&D by small firms. Preliminary 
injunction may result in the court decision to prevent both parts involved in a patent litigation 
to use the patent under dispute, sometimes by imposing a stop in the production of goods that 
incorporate the innovation protected by that patent. If a large firm can manage a similar risk, 
the lack of adequate financial resources can represent an unaffordable obstacle for smaller 
firms, especially if their activity is concentrated on a single business. In their study based on 
252 trials filed in Europe between January 1990 and June 1991, Lanjouw and Lerner (2001) 
show how the use of preliminary injunctions is a specific prerogative of large firms, which 
use this instrument twice compared to smaller firms. Large firms use preliminary injunctions 
as a means to prevent other firms to invest in the same technological areas in which they have 
been granted for patents. Even in the cases in which patent violation is not strongly 
demonstrable in court trials, small firms may lack the financial resources to file a patent suit. 
This behaviour allows larger firms to maintain a monopolistic control over specific 
technological areas, and eventually results in higher prices for the products that integrate the 
technology protected with patents. Apart from possible distortion in prices, however, from the 
social point of view the most negative effect is that the enforcement process of intellectual 
property rights undermines the R&D incentives of small firms (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 
2003). Moreover, the risk of litigation for small firms is larger and patent suits can be longer 
with respect to firms with large patent portfolios, because the latter may avoid suits or long 
settlements through the development of cooperative agreements after repeated interactions or 
disputes with other firms (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004). 
Furthermore, in the case of cumulative inventions, excessive protection stated by previous 
sentences of courts in favour of patent holders in cases of patent infringement may induce 
subsequent innovators to reduce their investments in that research trajectory (Llobet, 2003). 
The reason is that, in order to exploit an innovation based on a cumulative technology, the 
patent holder needs to license that patent to other firms that will build on it and develop 
subsequent innovations. A strong patent protection, stated by positive previous court 
sentences or settlements, will provide the patent holder with higher licensing fees – i.e., her 
bargaining power rises, as well as her capacity to extract higher rents from licensing. At the 
same time, however, a lower number of firms will be willing to invest in that research 
trajectory and hence to enter into licensing agreements with the original patent holder. The 
two effects go in opposite directions. However, the stronger the protection given to patents in   17
cumulative technological domains, the higher the likelihood that the second effect dominates 
the first one. The result of previous patent litigations might create barriers to entry, and might 
discourage more small improvements that would benefit the patent holder, in particular, and 
the whole society, in general terms. 
Apart from direct and indirect costs associated to patent litigation, the enforcement of patent 
rights has a strong effect on industry dynamics as well, and especially on the role played by 
smaller firms. The effects of strong property rights and high costs associated to patent 
litigation are particularly severe for smaller firms. This fact counterbalances the positive 
effect arising from strong IPRs on such a category of firms. While strong IPRs favour the 
entry in the market of small firms specialised in the supply of technologies or technological 
components, the enforcement of strong IPRs mainly punishes the same set of firms. High 
costs of enforcement lower their incentives to innovate, and prevent (small) firms from 
entering those technological areas strongly protected by incumbent patent holders. 
This aptitude is confirmed by empirical evidence. In one of the earliest studies on this issue 
based on a survey of 376 firms, Koen (1991) shows that, even though many smaller firms 
were aware of the fact that their patents were violated, in 55% of cases they were not taking 
any action to enforce their property rights, because of the high costs (and long time delays) 
associated with patent enforcement. Similarly, Cohen et al. (2000) show that the stronger 
motivations identified by small firms for avoiding to protect their innovations with patents are 
the costs associated with patent application and enforcement. In sum, although strong 
intellectual property rights are needed to technology-based small firms to enter the market and 
to supply technologies to downstream users, the costs associated to the patent system and to 
the enforcement of patent rights mitigates this positive effect and might result in a reduced 
than expected entry of smaller firms. Differences in costs associated to patents in different 
countries – e.g. the US vs. Europe – might induce different behaviours in firms operating in 
different markets. 
4.  Software technology: open science and patent system  
The software technology represents a peculiar case for understanding the advantages and 
drawbacks of differential levels of intellectual property protection. In fact in recent years 
software technologies have been characterised both by a strengthening of the patent system 
and a trend towards the sharing and free revealing of the software source code. The traditional 
mean of protecting intellectual property is instead the copyright institution, associated to 
proprietary licenses that usually limit the use, and deny the possibility to copy, modify and 
distribute the software. Furthermore, proprietary software is usually protected by trade secret 
and therefore the source code is not disclosed.  
Several scholars are trying to understand the sustainability of different models of IP 
protection, the reasons for different behaviour of actors, and the implications on the market 
dynamics. 
The empirical and historical analysis of software patenting documents a progressive 
strengthening of the patent system occurred first and foremost in the US and subsequently in 
Europe. Software was not patentable, given that patent offices have not allowed until recently 
the patenting of mathematical formulae and mental processes. The US Supreme Court in   18
Gottschalk vs. Benson
5 in 1972 did not consent to patent mathematical algorithms. During the 
1970s, courts decision followed this line, not allowing patents of “pure” software, and in 
particular of inventions whose novelty lied exclusively in a computer program. The courts 
position changed in 1981, when in Diamond vs. Diehr
6 it was held valid a patent for a process 
of temperature measurement of a machine by using a computer and a known equation. 
However, the protection did not cover other different applications. Software patenting was 
further strengthened in 1994 with In re Appalat
7,  when it was granted a patent for an 
algorithm applicable to a general purpose computer, without the need of specifying the 
applications of the computer program. Finally, in 1998 with State Street Bank & Trust vs. 
Signature Financial Group
8, the court allowed business methods patents (Cohen and Lemley, 
2001). In Europe the recent EU Directive on computer-implemented inventions, on which a 
lively debate is still in progress, is moving towards the patentability of software.  
The growth of software patents is however precedent to the policy changes just recalled. 
Recent studies have identified the existence of software patents through search procedures of 
words and combination of words referring to software (like software, computer program, 
algorithms, etc.) in the title and abstract of patents. Bessen and Hunt (2004) have illustrated a 
continuous growth in the number of software patents at the USPTO in the last 25 years. The 
number of patents is jumped from 1,080 in 1980s to more than 24,000 in 2002 (Figure 3). The 
website of the FFII software patents groups shows that at the EPO the number of patents is 
smaller but rapidly growing especially since 2000
9. 
 






















Source: Bessen and Hunt (2004) and http://swpat.ffii.org/patents/stats/country_stat.en.html. 
 
Bessen and Hunt (2004) also highlight the characteristics of patents and assignees of US 
software patents compared to all other patents in 1990-1995 (Table 3). It is worth noting that 
assignees are mostly companies, that the share of patents from individuals is lower for 
software than for other patents, that software patents are on average most cited and have a 
                                                 
5 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
6 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
7 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
8 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. Denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999). 
9 http://swpat.ffii.org/patents/stats/country_stat.en.html. Note that the numbers in the two patent systems are not 
perfectly comparable since they adopted different search procedures. However they provide a clear picture of the 
size and dynamics of the phenomenon in the two patent systems.   19
larger number of claims than other patents. This suggests that software patents have a 
potential broader application with respect to the rest of patents, which have less citations and 
claims. Moreover, the median of sales is larger for software patents assignees, suggesting a 
larger company size. Finally, the share of US assignees and inventors is larger for software 
patents. Contrarily, The statistics on EPO patents report that 46.84% of patents in the overall 
period have a US applicant, 21.76% a Japanese applicant. Among the European countries, 
Germany and Great Britain have the largest share of software patents (respectively 4.90% and 
4.76%). 
 
Table 3 – Characteristics of software patents in the US, 1990-1995 
 
Source: Bessen and Hunt (2004) 
 
 
The fact that large companies are the larger software patent holders seems to suggest that the 
increasing patentability of software may create high barriers for SMEs in the software sector. 
This hypothesis is also confirmed by the sectoral distribution of US software patents reported 
by Bessen and Hunt (2004). Seventy-five percent of software patents are applied by firms in 
manufacturing sectors (28% in Electronics, 24% in Mechanical, 9% in Instruments) while 
25% by firms in non-manufacturing sectors, and only 7% in the software sector. It is also 
worth emphasizing that software patenting by firms in other sectors may create barriers for 
small and new firms in the software sector and to the emergence of a specialized market for 
software technologies.  
Bessen and Hunt (2004) finally put forward that software patents might not provide additional 
incentives to innovation in this sector. In fact they show that R&D investments were already 
high before the IP strengthening, and that the annual rate of growth of R&D investments is 
dropped from an average of 16% in the 1980s to 11% in the 1990s. They point out that firms 
have essentially substituted R&D investments with increasing patenting. From a policy 
perspective this also implies that patent protection is not essential for the development of the 
software industry. Furthermore, the hypothesis of stronger incentives to innovation is scarcely 
supported from the recent growth of the number of developers of free/open source software. 
A rising number of innovators/developers prefer in fact sharing instead of protecting software 
knowledge (David, 2003; Lerner and Tirole, 2002a). 
David (2003) casts doubt on the fact that traditional means for protecting innovations are 
necessary for new technologies, discussing the fact that new technologies may require 
different institutional mechanisms and, in particular, mechanisms closer to the open science 
organization.  
 Software Other  patents
Characteristics of the Assignee 
Companies 88% 80%
Individuals/Not assigned  11% 18%
Government 2% 2%
U.S. assignee  70% 51%
U.S. inventor  69% 53%
Median of company sales (million $)  13,382 8,940
Characteristics of the Patent 
Average number of forward citations  9.7 4.6
Average number of claims  16.8 12.6  20
On the one hand a balance between IP protection of inventions and open science is considered 
healthy for technological progress and diffusion and for the creation of new firms. However 
the trade-off is that strong IP limits the possibility and speed of diffusion and further 
developments, but may positively act as a relevant signal for new and small firms.  
The adoption of mechanisms of open science communities like reputation, priority and 
cooperation favours the development of scientific inventions. Openness allows an open 
validation of research methods and results, and may avoid duplication of efforts (see 
Dasgupta and David, 1994 for specific cases in which inefficient duplications may occur in 
open science). On the contrary intellectual property protection on research limits the 
possibility of knowledge access from new and young scientists, and in particular limits the 
circulation of information and research tools.  Moreover, it may delay the publication of 
scientific research outcomes
10 and lead to some of the anti-commons problems that may occur 
in the supply of upstream inputs and research tools. 
In the open source software (OSS) system, developers may freely contribute to the 
development of a software project, whose source code can be freely downloaded and 
modified according to the licensing scheme attached to the project (for a description and 
discussion of the OSS licenses see Lerner and Tirole, 2002b, Giuri et al. 2002). The source 
code is distributed together with the object, binary software, under license schemes that allow 
anyone to download the source code, make modifications and redistribute the software either 
for free or for a relatively small fee (Raymond, 1999). 
The meaning of free software is associated to the Free Software Foundation, founded by 
Richard Stallman in 1983, and the GNU General Public License (GNU/GPL) that establishes 
very strong users’ rights (Stallman, 1999)
11. Later on, the diffusion of open source software 
increased substantially after the introduction of Linux by Linus Torvalds in 1991, and the 
creation of the Open Source Initiative (OSI). The OSI initiative launched an Open Source 
Definition and an OSI Certification Mark applicable to OSS licenses. The OSI also introduced 
additional types of licenses, which facilitate the commercial distribution of open source 
software with respect to the GNU/GPL. 
The empirical evidence on the diffusion of open source software is suggesting that the open 
source model may produce an intensified among large software producers like in the cases of 
Linux vs. Windows, or Apache vs. Microsoft
12. Apart from large OSS projects like Linux or 
Apache, many smaller projects have been introduced in the last few years. For example 
SourceForge.net, the largest web repository of OSS projects created in 1999 hosts at the 
beginning of 2005 97,950 registered projects and 1,041,049 users
13. However, most of them 
are composed by a very small number of participants and are characterised by a skewed 
distribution of activity levels (Giuri et al., 2004). 
What makes the study of open source software particularly relevant in the debate of strong vs. 
weak IP protection, is that on the one hand the open source system of knowledge production 
share some of the mechanisms of the open science communities, where individuals signal 
their qualities by contributing to a common project, by disclosing their innovation, and by 
                                                 
10 In Europe the priority of a patented invention starts from the filing date of the patent. For this reason, US 
inventors delay the publication of scientific outputs if they intend to patent in Europe. 
11 GPL allows users to have access to the source code on condition that he/she will make the source code freely 
available (or at the distribution costs which tend to be zero with the Internet) to third parties (copyleft property). 
12 Empirical evidence on the web server software is available at http://www.netcraft.com/survey/archive.html. 
For some models mainly inspired by the competition between Linux and Windows see Dalle and Julien (2001), 
Saint Paul (2001) and Casadeus and Ghemawat (2003). 
13 http://sourceforge.net/ - last visited: March 26
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refereeing the others’ contribution on a peer review basis. On the other hand some OSS 
producers aim at making profits in the business environment, without protecting their 
intellectual capital through patents or trade secret.  
Von Hippel and von Krogh (2003) discuss the open source system as an intermediate model 
situated between the strong intellectual property protection system (called “private”) and the 
“collective action” model.  
The latter shares some characteristics of the open science communities and of industrial 
contexts in which an informal exchange of know-how among producers is often frequent 
(Allen, 1983; von Hippel, 1987). The cases documented by Allen (1983) and von Hippel 
(1987) deal with information that are difficult to be protected through patents, and free 
revealing is more rewarding than maintaining the secret. In the case of the iron industry in the 
19
th century (Allen, 1983) manufacturers share information which is critical for improving 
furnaces performances and productivity. In the case of steel minimill process discussed by 
von Hippel (1987) the information shared among manufacturers is mainly non critical and 
incremental, and the benefit prevails over the cost of sharing the information. 
The idea discussed by von Hippel and von Krogh (2003) is in fact that a collective action 
model can emerge as a response to a market failure in the exchange and protection of 
knowledge. In this case maintaining the secret is not an available option for the 
manufacturers, since the effectiveness of protection is very scarce. They can therefore either 
contribute to the common stock of available knowledge or free ride. For the functioning of a 
collective action model the private reward from contributing should be larger than the private 
reward from free riding. However the risk of free riding, that is of waiting for others’ 
contributions and use them, should be corrected through the provision of right incentives like 
monetary subsidies or like the rule of priority typical of the open science model (Dasgupta 
and David, 1994). 
Von Hippel and von Krogh define the open source model as “private-collective” and one of 
its main characteristics is that the typical innovators are the users instead of the software 
producers. For producers the private incentives to innovate and protect are greater since they 
expect to have a larger target market for the innovation, which is composed by many users. 
By contrast the expected benefits from the innovation for users derive from the internal use, 
unless licensing the innovation to other users is an available option. For users therefore the 
loss of profits from revealing is lower than the benefits of internalising knowledge from a 
common pool. The open source system is in fact typical of settings in which users innovation 
are relevant for the producers, and therefore the sharing of information among users and 
producers is also beneficial for the latter (von Hippel, 1988; Harhoff et al., 2003). The other 
actors for which the open source software system is viable are the manufacturers of 
complementary goods or services. The cost of revealing the information (through posting 
messages on the web) and reducing profits by sharing non core information for the producer 
is lower than the reward from network effects and from the sales of complementary goods and 
services. Moreover in the OSS “private collective” model, contrarily to the collective action 
model, individual benefits from free revealing like learning and enjoyment from programming 
and contributing to a common project are available only to participants who reveal the 
information and not to free riders (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003). 
Gambardella and Hall (2005) emphasise the fact that open source software or the production 
of scientific inputs may often require downstream complementary investments for 
appropriating the returns from innovations. The problem is that if inputs in the production 
process are freely available, than the downstream market can be highly competitive since 
entry would not be precluded. Therefore the returns from investments would be very low and   22
not sufficient to cover the complementary investments in downstream assets. On the contrary 
IP protection of upstream inputs may raise the cost of entry, limit competition and allow 
downstream actors to obtain rents from their investments. One possible solution could be 
narrowing the protection only to the innovations of the downstream producers, thus reducing 
the potential broad blockage of entry of downstream firms if protection is allowed for general 
knowledge. Therefore, the development of open source software can facilitate entry and 
competition from small firms only when their competitive advantage resides in the 
complementary assets for the innovation, although with free inputs larger firms may enjoy 
advantages from larger scale investments in downstream activities. 
Finally, for some software technologies, the sharing of software knowledge may facilitate 
diffusion and the emergence of a standard. For this reasons the protection of software 
technologies characterised by network externalities may favour the creation of monopolies 
(Bessen and Hunt, 2004). 
5. Conclusions   
The aim of this paper was to analyse the characteristics of two alternative systems of IP 
protection – namely, strong IPRs and open science/open source – and the effects of both on 
market dynamics, and more precisely on small and large firms, and on entry of technology-
based firms into the market. From the analysis carried out so far it is possible to draw some 
conclusions. First, inter-sectoral differences are relevant and have to be taken into 
consideration. While the two models might operate together in some specific sectors (such as 
software), in others only one of the two seems mostly appropriate. Conditions such as the 
characteristics of the knowledge base, the presence of economies of scale in research 
activities, the complexity and the cumulativeness of the technology to be developed are key in 
defining which model offers the strongest incentives to innovators. 
Second, also related to the first issue, complementary assets become crucial. If new 
technological knowledge requires large investments in complementary assets in order to be 
fully exploited, the willingness to invest in such assets will be linked to the possibility to use 
the relevant knowledge on a private base. However, an open source model might also be 
appropriate in the case in which business actors mainly compete on the basis of 
complementary assets. Related to this point, understanding the different behaviour of large 
and small firms in the markets for technology and in the investments in complementary assets 
becomes crucial. For small firms focused on the development and commercialisation of 
technologies rather than products the IPR system seems necessary. In sectors like the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology this is the case. On the other hand, the open source model 
might favour the entry in the software industry of new and small firms that can freely access 
the technological knowledge and focus on downstream activities. 
Third, even though clear evidence has not been provided, and the literature is not univocally 
oriented toward this question, the two models can be expected to generate different incentives 
in the development of radical vs. incremental innovations. Usually, radical innovations 
require larger investments and are more risky. Inventors will sustain such costs and risks only 
if they can expect to exploit the innovation on a large market, preferably on a monopolistic 
base. If this is the case, only under the strong IPR model radical innovations can be pursued. 
By contrast, if an open source model operates, the possibility to promote further 
developments on a new scientific and technological knowledge is spread over several agents, 
all using the same (public) new knowledge. Hence, in an open source model, not only a rapid   23
diffusion of the innovation should be expected, but also a rapid process of introduction of 
incremental modifications to the same innovation.  
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